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At the National Building Museum in Washing-
ton, D.C., visitors often remark about a small
metal bar lining the inside wall on the top floor.'
The building was completed in 1887 for the U.S.
Pension Bureau (the present-day Veterans Admin-
istration). The metal bar was used to carry a bas-
ket which delivered messages from one office to
another. Eighty years later, the U.S. Department
of Defense developed an electronic network to ex-
change secret documents across the United
States. 2 The outgrowth of that system lead to to-
day's electronic mail ("e-mail") technology, avail-
able to millions of businesses and homes around
the country.
3
E-mail affords its users a quick and simple way
to communicate - whether between companies,
within corporations, or among friends. 4 With the
right equipment users can send e-mail over phone
I Based on the writer's personal experience as a tour
guide at the museum.
2 The network, called ArpaNET for Advanced Research
Projects Agency, was created so that Defense Department of-
ficials, academics, and scientists could communicate confi-
dentially around the United States. See Shawn McCarthy, In-
ternet's Evolution Becomes Computer-Era Revolution Series: Inside
Internet, WASH. POST, June 1, 1992, at F24; Gordon D. Lee,
Should Attorneys Use the Internet?, 44 R.I.B.J. at 27 (December
1995).
3 One recent article predicted that 40 million e-mail
users will send 60 billion messages by 2000. See Susan J. Sil-
vernail, Electronic Evidence: Discovery In the Computer Age, 58
ALA.LAw 176, 181 (1997). Americans spend 200 million
hours per day. using computers. See George Lardner, Jr.,
Panel Urges U.S. to Power Up Cyber Security, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
1997. Time magazine estimated that 2.6 trillion e-mail
messages passed through U.S.-based computer networks that
same year. By 2000, it is estimated that number will be 6.6
trillion. See S.C. Gwynne and John F. Dickerson, Lost in theE-
mai4 TIME, Apr. 21, 1997, at 88.
4 E-mail addresses consist of a computer user's name, a
computer address, and domain name. For instance, a hypo-
thetical address for the writer would be Bester@cua.edu,
where "Bester" is the user's name, "cua" is the computer ad-
dress at The Catholic University of America, and "edu" for
lines and networks in less time than it takes to
type the message. For example, at Microsoft
Corp., several employment interviews are com-
pleted in a one-day multiple interview format. As
the applicant passes through this process, inter-
viewers pass along e-mail comments to the next
interviewer about the applicant which may result
in a different style of interview. 5 The conversa-
tional tone often seen in e-mail has caused liabil-
ity for companies in lawsuits for such claims as
sexual harassment and fraud.6 One reason for
this is that e-mail users often do not realize their
messages may be saved.
7
In order to save space and storage costs, compa-
nies create guidelines for the regular and system-
atic destruction of old documents and correspon-
dence.8 Generally, companies will avoid judicial
sanctions when destroying stored documents pur-
suant to internal record retention policies. 9 Ad
educational institution is the domain name. Other common
domain names include ".com" for a company or commercial
institution, ".gov" for government addresses, and ".org" for
addresses that do not fit in any other category. See G. BUR-
GESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 10, n.5
(1995); see also Brendan P. Kehoe, Zen and the Art of the In-
ternet: A Beginner's Guide to the Internet, (1993); <http://ac-
cesss.tuscon.org/zen/zen-1.0_toc.html#SEC96> (visited Oc-
tober 1, 1997). SeeMeloffv. NewYork Life Insurance Co., 51
F.3d. 372 (2d. Cir. 1995) (where an employee was fired over
internal corporate e-mail system).
5 See Alex Markels, Management: Managers Aren't Always
Able to Get the Right Message Across with E-mail, WALL ST. J., Aug.
6, 1996, at BI.
6 See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F.Supp. 1186
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (sexual discrimination liability for employer
based on e-mail); Siemens Solar Industries v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 1994 WL 86368 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (e-mail discovered
which indicated that the defendant committed fraud); see also
Matthew Goldstein, Electronic Mail, Computer Messages Present
Knotty Issues of Discovery, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 1.
7 See Martha Middleton, A Discovery: There May Be Gold In
E-mail. 16 NAT'L L. J. JOURNAL, Sept. 20, 1993, at 1.
8 See JAMIE S. GORELICK, ET. AL., DESTRUCTION OF EvI-
DENCE, App. A, B at 391 (1989).
9 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.3 at 311. See also
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hoc paper document destruction, though, has
caused problems for companies.'0 Courts have
also penalized litigants for destroying electronic
records. ' I
This Comment first will examine the proce-
dural steps necessary to use e-mail in a lawsuit.
Next, this Comment will explore the use of e-mail
as the "smoking gun." This Comment will next
focus on destruction of evidence, sanctions for
that destruction and their application in the elec-
tronic age. Finally, it will conclude that judges
should examine destruction of e-mail evidence in
light of that technology's unique characteristics.
II. E-MAIL AND LIABILITY: PERFECT
TOGETHER
A. Electronic Mail: Technological and Legal
Implications
To those who are not computer experts, e-mail
is a simple concept: a computer user opens the
appropriate e-mail program, types an e-mail ad-
dress, then types a message, and hits a key to send
the message. Seconds later, an icon on the screen
of the recipient user flashes to alert the recipient
she has a message. She opens the mail and reads
it. The whole process, from conception to writing
to sending and reading the message on the other
end, can take less than five minutes.
12
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 10.4-10.8.
10 See, e.g., Computer Associates Int'l v. American
Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 170 (D. Colo. 1990) (default
judgment entered after defendant destroyed evidence);
United States v. Fineman, 434 F.Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affl by 571 F.2d. 572 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. den. 436 U.S. 945
(1978) (prosecution for obstruction of justice under 18
U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). See also Michael Al-
len, Cleaning House: U.S. Companies Increasing Attention to De-
stroying Files, WALL S. .J. Sept. 2, 1987, at 1.
11 See American Fundware, 133 F.R.D. 166, 170 (D. Colo.
1990); Win. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Centers,
Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1450 (C.D. Cal.1984) [hereinafter
"GNC"] (defendant had a duty to preserve records it should
have foreseen would be relevant in lawsuit).
12 See AndrewJohnson Laird, Smoking Guns and Spinning
Disks, 11 No. 8 COMNIUThR L\w., Aug., 1994, at 1, 3.
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
14 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Hick-
man and subsequent cases hold that there are limits to dis-
coverable information. Attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine are among the ways attorneys can prevent
discovery of any information. See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.4 -7.5 at 385-86
(1993).
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Rule 26(a) requires disclo-
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
discovery, the process of pre-trial information
sharing of such a message, during a civil suit.1
3
According to Rule 26(b) (1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and case law,' 4 discovery may
be made of any matter which is not privileged,
that will likely lead to discoverable evidence. In
1970, Congress amended the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to accommodate the computer
age. Specifically, Rule 26(a) requires pre-trial dis-
closures to the opposing party.' 5 In addition,
Rule 34(a) 16 was re-written to require parties to
produce electronic forms of evidence in "reason-
ably usable form," when information is re-
quested.' 7 Modern practice has proven that dis-
covery of electronic information is "crucial" to
complex litigation. 18
Discovery requests for e-mail are becoming
more popular." For example, in Adams v. Dan
River Mills, Inc.,20 a federal district court held that
because of the low cost and accuracy in producing
computer printouts and computer tapes, their dis-
covery should not be blocked. 2 1 But the volume
of electronic discovery can be massive. According
to one report during the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment's investigation into the merger of Microsoft
Corp. with Intuit Corp., Intuit was served with an
electronic data request totaling 76 pages. 22 Intuit
met the request by searching 15,000,000 pages of
sure at the outset of litigation such information as the identi-
ties of those persons believed to have discoverable informa-
tion. Rule 26(a)(1)(A), and copies of all documents relevant
to the dispute. Rule 26(a)(1)(B).
16 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Rule 34(a) reads: Scope: Any
party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting
on the requestor's behalf, to inspect and copy, any desig-
nated documents (including . . . other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, translated, if neces-
sary, by the respondent through detection devices into rea-
sonably usable form). See id.
17 See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1383-
84 (7th. Cir. 1993) (electronic information is discoverable
and a party can be sanctioned for refising to produce it).
18 See John T. Soma and Steven G. Austin, A Practical
Guide to Discovering Computerized Files In Complex Litigation, 11
REv. LITi. Summer, 1992, at 501, 502. See also Middleton,
supra note 7 ("electronic media discovery is becoming in-
creasingly critical in almost every kind of lawsuit... ").
19 See Charles A. Lovell and Roger W. Holmes, The Dan-
gers of E-mail: The Need for Electronic Data Retention Policies, 44
R.I. B.J., Dec., 1995, at 7.
2) See generally 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972).
21 Id. at 222.
22 Lovell and Holmes, supra note 19, at 9.
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text and more than 80,000 e-mail messages. 23
E-mail must also overcome evidentiary barriers
before being admitted. 24 First, e-mail must be rel-
evant.25 Parties using e-mail must also overcome
challenges to its admissibility on hearsay
grounds.26 Clearly e-mail is an out of court asser-
tion.27 However, it appears litigants could over-
come the hearsay exclusion by arguing exceptions
to the Federal Rule of Evidence. 28
Such a tactical maneuver was used in United
States v. Ferber.29 A Massachusetts federal court
held that e-mail was admissible against a defend-
ant indicted on fraud and bribery charges.30 An
internal corporate e-mail message followed an in-
criminating conversation between the defendant
and a co-worker. 3' An e-mail message was then
sent by the co-worker to his supervisor, in what
the writer termed an "upset" state of mind.32
Although the trial court refused to admit the e-
mail message under neither the business records
exception 33 nor the excited utterance exception
to the hearsay rule,3 4 it did eventually admit the
23 Id.
24 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); United States v. Ferber, 966 F.
Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997).
25 Strauss v. Microsoft Corp. held that e-mail was relevant
to an employment discrimination case to show the company's
underlying attitude towards promoting women. See 1995 WL
326492 *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
26 FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) defines hearsay as, "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
27 See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). See also Anthony J. Dreyer,
Note, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of Elec-
tronic Mail Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2285, 2287 (1996) (ar-
guing that e-mail should be admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6), but it is often admitted under Evidence
Rule 801(d)(1) (A), as a party's own statement). See also
James H.A. Pooley and David M. Shaw, Finding What's Out
There: Technical and Legal Aspects of Discovery, 4 Tex. INTELL.
PROP. J. 57, 69 (Fall 1996).
28 See FED. R. EVID. 803 (1996) (which spells out 24 ex-
ceptions to the rule against admitting hearsay as evidence).
See also Aviles v. McKenzie, 1992 WL 715248 n.2. (N.D. Cal.
1992) (where e-mail is admitted under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)). Another avenue for litigants to pursue is ex-
empting e-mail from the hearsay ban via FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
However, this argument has not garnered court acceptance
yet. See Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997); Dreyer,
supra note 27, at 2322.
29 See generally 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997).
30 See U.S. v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 92, 99 (D. Mass.
1997).
31 See id. at 98.
32 See id.
33 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
34 See generally U.S. v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99; FED. R.
message as a present sense impression.35 On re-
explanation of the trial judge's rulings, however,
it reversed itself and found the message was ad-
missible under the excited utterance exception
because the it was written only a short time after
the conversation.3
6
B. E-mail as the Smoking Gun
One of the biggest myths in the electronic
world is that once a recipient deletes a message
from her screen it is gone forever.3 7 Computers
delete data by moving it out of the way.38 Data is
"removed" when new saved data takes its place.
Only then does it become inaccessible to the
user. 39 One of the most notorious examples was
Oliver North's attempt to cover up arms sales to
support the Contras in Nicaragua.4 11 The e-mail
North thought were deleted were later retrieved
from his computer and used against him.
4 1
In addition, e-mail has caused civil and criminal
liability, 42 and costly litigation. 43 Siemens Solar In-
EVID. 803(2).
3-1 See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
36 See id.
37 In addition, the pathway taken by a particular e-mail
can be traced. See Sharon Walsh, Destroying Documents and
Legal Defenses; Experts Say Texaco Case Points Up How Shredders
Can Come Back to Haunt Companies, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1997,
at HO.
"8 See Heidi L. McNeil and Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-
mail and Other Computerized Information, ARIZ. ATr'v, Apr.
1995, at 18.
39 Even then, professionals and simple utility programs
can bring back "lost" data. Id. One problem for law enforce-
ment agencies is the lack of technical expertise to prosecute
a crime such as trade secret theft. See People v. Eubanks, 47
Cal.App.4th 158, 165 (1997).
40 See RonaldJ. Ostrow and Michael Wines, North's Ex-Sec-
retary Tells of Destroying Data, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1987, at Al.
41 Pooley and Shaw, supra note 27, at 63. A staffer for the
Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra scan-
dal, found the messages that North and his colleagues be-
lieved were deleted. See Lawrence J. Magid, As North Learned,
Deleted Files Are Retrievable, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1987, at Busi-
ness 4.
42 See, e.g., Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (plaintiff claimed sexual harassment via e-mail);
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d. 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison
guard denied harassing subordinate until shown a copy of his
e-mail); Aviles v. McKenzie, 1992 WL 715248 *10 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (plaintiff successfully rebutted defendant's motion for
summary judgment using e-mail); United States v. Morris,
928 F.2d. 504 (2d. Cir. 1991), cert. den., 502 U.S. 817 (1991)
(upholding conviction for spreading a virus through the in-
ternet). See also Dreyer, supra note 27, at 2288 (noting that
90 percent of companies with 1,000 or more employees use e-
mail).
43 The case regarded an e-mail message listing twenty
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dustries v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,4 4 began in 1989
when Siemens bought from defendant ARCO a
company devoted to developing commercial solar
energy technology. 45 When Siemens made its de-
cision to buy ARCO's company, it relied on re-
ports made by the defendant that the new solar
technology would be profitable. 46 After the sale,
however, it found that the technology was not
commercially viable; Siemens sued for breach of
contract, fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. 47 In its complaint, Siemens alleged that
before the closing date, ARCO's officers knew
that the new technology would not be profita-
ble. 48 Siemens based these allegations on e-mail it
discovered between ARCO executives.
49
In Strauss v. Microsoft Corp.,50 an assistant editor
of a Microsoft publication filed a sex discrimina-
tion claim against the company.51 The plaintiff al-
leged Microsoft passed her over twice for promo-
tions and instead hired less qualified male
candidates. 52 She pointed to an e-mail message
five reasons "why beer is better than women" and an anony-
mously sent pornographic image received by the plaintiff was
part of a $2.2 million settlement in a sexual harassment case
against Chevron Corp. See Marc Peyser and Steve Rhodes,
When E-mail is Oops Mail, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 82.
One of the more notable lawsuits includes a race discrimina-
tion suit by two Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. employees after
racist jokes were sent along the company's e-mail system. Af-
ter the e-mail was sent, the employees complained about
them and were subsequently denied promotions. The plain-
tiffs argued the denial was in retaliation for complaining
about the e-mail. The two employees sued for $30 million
each in damages and asked the court to certify their suit as a
class action to include all black employees at the company.
See Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 1997 WL 403454 *1,
74, Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Frances
A. McMorris, Morgan Stanley Employees File Suit, Charging Race
Bias Over EmailJokes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B8.
44 See generally 1994 WL 86368 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
45 See id. at *1.
46 See id. at *2.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. at *2. The message sent by an ARCO employee
concerning the impending sale read, "as it appears that [the
technology in question] is a pipe dream, let Siemens have
the pipe." See Leslie Helm, The Digital Smoking Gun: Misman-
aged E-mail Poses Serious Risks, Experts Warn, L.A. Times June
16, 1994 at D1. The federal court dismissed the case without
prejudice for lack of diversity after it dismissed federal securi-
ties law claims with prejudice. See id. at *7.
50 See generally 814 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
51 See id. at 1188.
52 See id. at 1188-89.
53 Id. at 1193. The message appeared to be written to
Julian Birnbaum, another Microsoft employee. See id. The
second person Microsoft promoted instead of the plaintiff
needed much training, according to another e-mail message
sent by the publication's editor which stated that a
hired male candidate was, "adequate-but not
great."53 The plaintiff retrieved four additional e-
mail messages with sexual references as evidence
of gender discrimination. 54 The court rejected
the arguments made by Microsoft to exclude the
e-mail on relevancy grounds and prejudice to the
defendant. 55 Microsoft argued that the messages
unfairly could lead a jury to believe that the rea-
son the plaintiff was not promoted was because of
her gender.56 The trial court also denied a mo-
tion by the defendant for summary judgment, and
held that the plaintiff showed a sufficient nexus
between the e-mail and the decision not to pro-
mote her.
57
Sending e-mail also lead to federal or state
criminal liability. 58 The Computer Abuse Act of
198459 prohibits unauthorized entry to federal in-
terest computers,6" including "hacking" and
spreading viruses. 61 The Electronic Communica-
sent by the journal's editor, Jon Lazraus. Id.
54 The four e-mails at issue were: (1) an e-mail message
received by plaintiff containing a satirical message entitled
"Alice in UNIX Land"; (2) an e-mail advertisement sent by
Lazarus to the Journal staff containing a product announce-
ment for replacement "Mouse Balls"; (3) a message for-
warded by Lazarus to a male Journal staff member containing
a news report on Finland's proposal to institute a sex holiday;
(4) a parody also forwarded by Lazarus, of a play entitled 'A
Girl's Guide to Condoms' to a male staff member via e-mail,
who later sent it to plaintiff. See Strauss, 1995 WL 326492, at
*4. Lazarus also told the plaintiff that he was "president of
the amateur gynecology club." Strauss, 814 F. Supp. at 1194.
55 See 1995 WL 326492 at *4, 5.
56 See id.
57 See Strauss, 814 F. Supp. at 1194, n.9. Microsoft re-
newed its motion for partial summary judgment after the
Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993), but the motion was denied again. See
856 F. Supp. 821, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
58 See Catherine Therese Clarke, From Criminet to Cyber-
Perp: Toward an Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving Crimi-
nal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 191 (1996).
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994), as amended.
60 A federal interest computer is defined as:
(A) A computer exclusively for the use of a financial in-
stitution or the United States Government, or, in the
case of a computer not exclusively for such, used by or
for a financial institution or the United States Govern-
ment and the conduct constituting the offense affects
the use of the financial institution's operation or the
Government's operation of such a computer; or (B)
which is one of two or more computers used in commit-
ting the offense, not at all of which are located in the
same State.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2) (A-B) (1994).
61 United States v. Petersen, 98 F.3d. 502, 504-510 (9th
Cir. 1996) (affirming conviction for computer fraud under
(Vol. 6
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tions Privacy Act of 1986,62 prohibits unauthor-
ized interception and access of electronically
stored data. Also, traditional crimes such as fraud
or threats can be adapted for prosecutions result-
ing from e-mail.
63
Theft of trade secrets was at the center of a
prosecution under section 499(c) of the Califor-
nia Penal Code in People v. Eubanks.64 California
prosecuted co-defendant Eugene Wang after he
became disenchanted with his employer and e-
mailed messages containing his company's trade
secrets to a competitor, Symantec.65 After
Gordon Eubanks, president of Symantec, received
the e-mails, Wang's company filed a criminal com-
plaint.
6 6
III. DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE AND
CORPORATE DOCUMENT
DESTRUCTION POLICIES
The first impulse after a lawsuit is filed may be
to rid storage of any evidence which may impli-
cate oneself in the lawsuit. 67 Besides criminal
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)). In footnote one of the opinion,
Judge Fletcher defines hacking as, "the ability to bypass com-
puter security protocols and gain access to computer sys-
tems.". United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d. 504, 511 (2d. Cir.
1991) cert. denied 502 U.S. 817 (1991) (affirming conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (5) (A) for spreading a virus
through the Internet). But see U.S. v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d.
1069, 1079 (1st Cir. 1997) (overturning conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1030).
62 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710 (1994).
63 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994) (mail and wire
Fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994); U.S. v. Patillo, 438 F.2d.
13,15 (4th Cir. 1971) (prosecution for verbally threatening
the President); U.S. v. Miller, 115 F.3d. 361, 362 (6th Cir.
1997) (prosecution for threatening the President by letter).
64 See generally 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995),
vacated 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1997).
65 See id. at 847.
66 See Eubanks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-47. Eubanks was
charged with 11 counts of receiving stolen property and con-
spiracy; and Wang was charged with 21 counts of conspiracy
and trade secret violations. See Carla Lazzareschi & Martha
Groves, 2 Indicted On Trade-Secret Theft Charges Technology: Sy-
mantec's Chairman and an Employee Are Accused of Stealing Inside
Information from Borland, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993 at D1. The
district attorney's office later was disqualified because Bor-
land helped pay for technical assistance during the prosecu-
tion. See 927 P.2d. 310 (Cal. 1997).
67 See, e.g., GNC, 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (dis-
missal in civil case after defendant destroyed documents),
affd 104 F.R.D. 119 (C.D. Calif. 1985) (sanction approved on
appeal); United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for obstruction of
justice by destroying documents); Smith v. Superior Ct., 151
Cal. App. 3d. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (West
laws, 68 which apply to the destruction of evidence
in both criminal and civil suits, courts may invoke
other sanctions to punish parties, such as allowing
a jury to draw adverse inferences or ordering de-
fault judgments. 69 In addition, ethics rules pro-
hibit attorneys from destroying evidence. 7(' These
punishments often turn on the intent of the
"spoliating 71 or destroying party, as well as the
overall damage done.72 Courts look at four key
issues when confronted with destruction of evi-
dence: (1) what evidence was destroyed, (2)
when was the evidence in question destroyed, (3)
who destroyed the evidence, and (4) how was the
evidence destroyed.
73
Internal corporate document retention policies
allow companies some leeway in destroying docu-
ments. Courts have recognized that organiza-
tions, due to high storage and organization costs,
cannot be expected to keep documents forever.7 4
Most times, these records may be destroyed as
long as they are not relevant to some ongoing or
foreseeable litigation.7 5 This, however, begs the
questions, "when is a document relevant," and,
Supp. 1997).
69 See Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No.
93 Civ. 1126 (LAP), 1994 WL 86368, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
70 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4
(1996); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR7-102(7),(8); DR 7-109(A); DR 7-107(C) (7) (1979). Pro-
fessor Oesterle said that the lack of charges brought and con-
victions obtained illustrates ethics rules do little to deter at-
torney conduct. See Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant's
Remedies for an Opponent's Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant
Documents, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1185, 1219 (1983). The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility deals with evidence de-
struction only under the auspices of refraining from partici-
pating or advising a client to participate in illegal activity.
Texas attorneys Cedillo and Lopez call the codes "toothless"
to prevent document destruction. See Ricardo G. Cedillo &
David Lopez, Document Destruction in Business Litigation From a
Practitioner's Point of View: The Ethical Rules vs. Practical Reality,
20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 637, 640 (1989).
71 The term "spoliation" originates from the doctrine of
drawing an adverse inference against one who spoliates, or
destroys evidence; it comes from the Latin phrase omnia
praesummuntur contra spoliatorem. GORELICK, ET AL., supra note
8, § 1.3 at 56.
72 See, e.g., Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d. 491 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So.2d. 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
73 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8, § 1.7, at 11-12.
74 See Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d. 734,
737 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that documents destroyed pur-
suant to regular records destruction policy could not support
adverse inference). Cf Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.,
836 F.2d. 1104 (8th Cir. 1987) (case remanded to determine
reasonableness of corporate records retention policy).
75 In a prosecution under the Clean Water Act, the dis-
trict court entered a default judgment for plaintiffs and lev-
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"when is litigation foreseeable? ' 76
Lawrence Solum and Stephen Marzen (herein-
after "Solum and Marzen"), well known scholars
in the field of destruction of evidence, argued de-
struction of evidence undermined two important
goals of the judicial system-truth and fairness.
77
Jamie Gorelick, another scholar in the field, ad-
ded to these the fundamental integrity of the judi-
cial system. 78  The main reason to prohibit de-
struction of evidence, these scholars argued, is
that destruction reduced the likelihood "that the
judicial process will reach accurate results.
' 7
9'
Thus, prohibitions on the destruction of evidence
punish, deter,80 compensate8 ' and restore accu-
racy8 2 to the fact finding process.
A. Methods Of Controlling Destruction of
Evidence
1. Criminal Sanctions
It may surprise the reader that no Federal crim-
ied a $12.6 million penalty on defendants, in part because of
defendants' failure to adhere to retention provisions. The
applicable records retention statute mandated a three-year
retention program. The defendants could produce only
seven months of records. See United States v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997).
76 See John M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Docu-
ment Retention and Destruction: Practical Legal and Ethical Con-
siderations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAWYER, 5, 18 (1980).
77 See Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth
and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36
EMORY L.J. 1085, 1138 (1987).
78 See GORELICK, ET AL., supra note 8, § 1.13, at 16-18.
79 Solum & Marzen, supra note 77, at 1138.
80 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8, § 1.21, at 27-28. A
rule restoring accuracy to the factfinding process after de-
struction of evidence punishes the effects of the destruction
rather than restores the actual destruction. See id. But see
Nesson, infra note 8 1, at 801. Nesson calls the theory that the
default sanction deters future spoliation "sophistry ....
[t]here is nothing punitive in imposing default or dismissal
in a case the spoliator would have lost anyway." Id.
81 See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in
Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 793, 800 (1991) (compensation as rationale for
discovery sanctions). See also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 1.21, at 27.
82 Restoring accuracy is not a solid basis on which tojus-
tify destruction of evidence sanctions because courts's recon-
struction of evidence sometimes will be inaccurate, trumping
the very goal of the doctrine. As a result, punishment is a
much stronger justification for imposing penalties on spolia-
tors of evidence than is accuracy.
83 See Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 76, at 19. State
criminal statutes on the destruction of evidence are beyond
the scope of this paper. The federal statutes section here is
meant only to give the reader an understanding of the crimi-
inal statutes deal specifically with destruction of
evidence."3 However, Federal obstruction of jus-
tice statutes are available to prosecute parties who
destroy evidence in both civil and criminal
cases.8 4 The four elements necessary to prove an
obstruction of justice charge are that (1) the de-
fendant destroyed relevant documents;8 5 (2) the
defendant knew the documents were relevant
86
(3) to a pending judicial proceeding, with 7 (4)
the purpose of obstructing justice. 8
Courts have differed on the level of mens rea
necessary to prove an obstruction of justice
nal penalties and judicial inquiries on the doctrine. For an
outline of state laws on destruction of evidence. See also
GORELICK, ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 5.7-5.10.
84 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994), (obstruction of jus-
tice); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting ob-
struction of justice in administrative or legislative proceed-
ing). In civil cases, Solum & Marzen argue by comparison,
"threat of criminal prosecution for evidence destruction...
[may] be more theoretical than real," pointing out that no
party has ever been convicted of destroying evidence in a civil
case. Solum & Marzen, supra note 77, at 1106.
85 See United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d. 728, 734 (9th Cir.
1972) (conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 reversed where
government could not show relevancy of destroyed evi-
dence); GORELICK ET AL. supra note 8, § 5.3 n.17; Oesterle,
supra note 70, at 1197 (where Oesterle argued that the 'rele-
vancy' requirement was "surprising" because nothing in the
language of the statute required relevance; he attributed the
theory to a mistaken interpretation of the statute).
86 The test appears to be reasonable belief of the defend-
ant. United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d. 451, 457-458 (5th Cir.
1984), rehg denied 726 F.2d. 168 (5th Cir. 1984); but see Oes-
terle, supra note 70, at 1199-1201 (which folds the knowledge
test into the motive prong of the statute).
87 See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d. 676, 679 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Fedders & Guttenplan, supra note 76, at 21 (stat-
ing that the pendency requirement ensures accused has no-
tice that interfering with an ongoing proceeding carries crim-
inal penalties).
88 Professor Oesterle argued that most times intent to
obstruct justice may be inferred from the act itself. Oesterle,
supra note 70, at 1199. What is in dispute is "whether an act
violates this section if the defendant in fact does not specifi-
cally intend to obstructjustice .... but has knowledge or is
on notice that an obstruction of justice is the likely result of
his conduct." Id. at 1199. The statutory framework in 1503 is
replicated in 1505 for obstruction ofjustice during agency or
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charge. 9 Some federal courts require knowledge
that the probable outcome of the defendant's acts
will be to obstruct justice. 9 ° For example, in
United States v. Jeter,9 1 the government prosecuted
Jeter on obstruction ofjustice charges after he dis-
tributed grand jury transcripts to the targets of
those grand jury proceedings.9 2 In affirming his
conviction, the court held that the defendant
must obstruct justice with a general intent of
knowledge and a specific intent to obstruct jus-
tice.9 3 By contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Neiswender held that
while the defendant knew his conduct would not
obstruct justice, he could still be found guilty.
9 4
ChiefJudge Haynsworth wrote "[t] hat the defend-
ant's design [was] irrelevant," and as long as the
"natural result" of his scheme was to obstruct jus-
tice his conviction would stand.
9 5
The pendency requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1503
simiply requires presentation of evidence before a
grand jury.9 6 A federal district court maintained
that a person who (1) knew about a Grand Jury
investigation, (2) had reason to believe that a cer-
tain document may come to its attention, and (3)
caused its destruction intentionally to prevent the
Grand Jury from seeing it, was guilty of violating
Congressional proceedings and 1510 to provide sanctions for
violations before legislative, judicial, or administrative pro-
ceedings begin. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1510 (1994).
89 Obstruction ofjustice charges have both an actus reus,
a physical action, as well as a mens rea, the commensurate
mental state. See Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing
Happened On the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document De-
struction, and the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute. 67 N.Y.U.
L.REv. 570 (1992).
90 See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893)
(conviction under a predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1503); United
States v. Ryan, 455 F2d. 728 (9th Cir. 1972) (obstruction of
justice conviction overturned). See also United States v. So-
low, 138 F.Supp. 812, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that the
statute, "condemns not only the corrupt obstruction of the
administration ofjustice but also any endeavor to corrupt the
due administration of justice").
91 See generally 775 F.2d. 670 (6th Cir. 1985).
92 SeeJeter, 775 F.2d. at 673.
93 SeeJeter, 775 F.2d. at 679.
94 See United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d. 1269 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Neiswender, the defendant was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 when he approached an attorney
during a criminal trial claiming he could influence the jury
when he had no such ability. Id.
95 Neiswender, 590 F.2d. at 1274.
96 See United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d. 676, 678 (3d.
Cir. 1978).
97 See United States v. Fineman, 434 F.Supp. 197, 202
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 371. A conspiracy exists when "there is
section 1503.97
In addition to the obstruction of justice stat-
utes, the Justice Department may prosecute de-
struction of evidence under the conspiracy sec-
tion of Title Eighteen of the United States Code,
alleging that defendants conspired to defraud the
United States by destroying documents.98 Still an-
other option is to charge criminal contempt
under 18 U.S.C. § 401, which takes place when a
court orders a party to produce documents and
the party subsequently destroys them.99 Finally,
although there has not been a prosecution for
document destruction under it, 18 U.S.C. § 1001
generally prohibits false statements to a court. 00
2. Civil Sanctions
In civil suits, judges rely on the language of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37,11 to sanction par-
ties who abuse the discovery process.'0 2 For ex-
ample, Rule 37(c) authorizes a court to "impose
other appropriate sanctions" where a party does
not disclose certain information, 10 3 comply with a
court order, 0 4 attend a deposition, answer inter-
rogatories, respond to a request for inspection,10 5
or fails to formulate a discovery plan.
10 6
(1) an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the conspirators
in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) an intent on the
part of the conspirators to defraud the United States govern-
ment." Fedders & Guttenplan supra note 76, at 31, citing
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443
n.20 (1978); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d. 950 (3d. Cir.
1979); United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. See also United States v.
Buffalino, 205 F.2d. 408 (2d. Cir. 1960).
99 See Fedders and Guttenplan, supra note 76, at 31.
100 See id. at 34.
101 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (A-C) (which spells out a
federal court's authority to impose sanctions).
102 See lain Johnston, Federal Courts' Authority to Impose
Sanctions for Pre-litigation or Pre-Order Spoliation of Evidence, 156
F.R.D. 313, 315-16 (1994). SeeWm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen-
eral Nutrition Centers, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (ordering dismissal); Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v
Forest Hills Distrib., Inc., 692 F.2d. 214, 218-19 (1st Cir.
1982) (affirming trial court's imposition of adverse infer-
ence).
103 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) or 26(e)(1). The 1993 Advi-
sory Committee Notes state that sanctioning a party by pre-
cluding use of that evidence at trial is not an effective sanc-
tion; however, the notes go on to say that a court has many
other sanctioning options, including declaring facts as estab-
lished or allowing the jury to become aware of the nondisclo-
sure. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 Advisory Committee's Note.
104 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
105 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
106 See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 7 (g).
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The sanctions under Rule 37 are powerful, but
are limited to cases where a court already has or-
dered a party to preserve evidence. 0 7 One com-
mentator suggested Congress cure this problem
by codifying a ban on destruction of evidence and
sanctioning power in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 08 In practice, though, this has been
addressed already as courts have expanded their
power to sanction parties for document destruc-
tion before an order is issued.' 0 9
For instance, in Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General
Nutrition Corp., Inc.,110 Wm. T. Thompson Co.
("Thompson") sued General Nutrition Center
Corp., Inc. ("GNC") over "bait and switch" adver-
tising practices."1  Thompson served GNC with
requests for production of documents a few weeks
after filing suit. "2 In a set of findings of fact, the
court concluded that GNC had kept and subse-
quently destroyed records, some in electronic
form, pertaining to purchases, sales and inven-
tory. 13 The court ordered a default judgment
against GNC because it had a duty to preserve
these records." 4 Notice was provided before the
107 See Solum & Marzen, supra note 77, at 1095; Oseterle,
supra note 70, at 1222 (arguing that a destroying party may
become sanctionable only after the court enters an order to
preserve documents). Cf Johnston, supra note 102, at 324-25
(asserting that pre-order sanctions are possible within the
language of Rule 37, but that the court's "inherent power"
justification is stronger for those sanctions). Professor Nes-
son said spoliation is a growing practice in civil litigation
which threatens to undermine the integrity of the civil trial
process, in part because of lax judicial enforcement of penal-
ties. See Nesson, supra note 81, at 794-95.
108 Professor Oesterle argued to reform the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, adding new rules under Rule 26,
Rule 34, and Rule 37 because the existing rules did not suffi-
ciently deter spoliators of evidence. See Oesterle, supra note
70, at 1240-43. Osterle's comments after his proposed rules
indicate that the baseline doctrine is that a litigant may not
destroy relevant evidence intentionally once he knows an ac-
tion is pending. Oesterle would expand that standard to
criminal prosecutions for destruction of evidence by remov-
ing the negligence defense. Under this regime, the only de-
fense would be that the destruction was not only inadvertent,
but also non-negligent. The comments to the proposed rules
accord with the approach of the court in Lewy v. Remington
Arms. Co.: one has a responsibility to preserve documents if
she can foresee litigation concerning the documents. See 836
F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988).
109 Courts have relied on an "inherent power" not specif-
ically vested in the Rules of Civil Procedure to punish spolia-
tors before issuing a specific order not to do so. See Link v.
Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Cf Cedillo & Lo-
pez, supra note 70, at 647-48.
110 See generally 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D.Cal. 1984).
111 See id. at 1444. GNC also filed suit against Thomp-
son, but its grounds are not relevant to this paper.
112 See id.
suit was filed that the documents were relevant to
the dispute. 1 5 The court announced that, even
without a specific request for the documents,
when a party knows or reasonably should know
that a document will become important to a law-
suit, that party has a duty not to destroy that docu-
ment. 16
By contrast, the Texas Supreme Court over-
turned the default sanction ordered by the trial
court in Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon1 7 after the trial
court struck some of Chrysler's pleadings in. the
context of a wrongful death suit.' 18 The trial
court's imposition of sanctions was overturned by
state Supreme Court by: (1) examining the direct
relationship between the offensive conduct and
the sanction, and (2) the checking that the sanc-
tion was not be excessive.119 By that standard, the
trial court in Blackmon abused its discretion when
it ordered the "death penalty" sanction 120 First,
the sanction was not directed at the offensive con-
duct-there was no showing that the victim's fam-
ily could not prepare for trial without the missing
documents.' 2' Second, default judgment on lia-
113 See id. at 1446.
114 See id. at 1456.
1 t5 The records were "reasonably likely to be requested
by Thompson during discovery in the litigation," and there-
fore GNC had a duty to preserve them. Id. at 1446.
116 See id. at 1455 citing Bowmar Instrument Corp. v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 25 FED. R. SERV. 423 (N.D.Ind.
1977) and In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,
506 F.Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Computer Associ-
ates Int'l, Inc., v. American Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166
(Colo. 1990). In ordering sanctions, the Colorado court
spelled out a three part test: "(1) that [American Fundware]
acted willfully or in bad faith; (2) that [Computer Associates
Int'l, Inc.] was seriously prejudiced by [American
Fundware's] actions; and (3) that alternative sanctions would
not adequately punish." Id. at 169.
117 See generally 841 S.W.2d. 844 (Tex. 1992).
118 See id. at 845. The corporation argued that it had de-
stroyed some records pursuant to its document destruction
policy, and thus, were no longer available. See id. at 846 n. 6.
119 See id. at 844. See also Transamerican Natural Gas
Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d. 913 (Tex. 1991). Transamerican
involved a breach of contract dispute where a default judg-
ment was entered against TransAmerica after its president
did not attend his deposition. The sanctions imposed by the
trial court were overturned on appeal on account of their
severity. 811 S.W.2d. at 918-919. The appeals court focused
on the range of sanctions available to a trial court, and held
that the default judgment was not 'Just" as referred to in
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215. Transamerican, 811
S.W.2d. at 916, 918.
120 "Death Penalty" discovery sanctions are "those that
terminate the presentation of the merits of a party's claims."
Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 845.
121 Id. at 849-50.
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bility was more severe than necessary to satisfy the
legitimate purposes of sanctions for discovery
abuse.1 22 Another option for a judge is simply to
allow a jury to infer certain facts when evidence
destruction comes to light.' 23 This common law
doctrine holds that the factfinder may draw an
unfavorable inference against a party who has de-
stroyed relevant documents because that party is
assumed to have been motivated by a desire to
cover up damaging evidence.' 24 The key to the
spoliation inference is some form of intention to
destroy the evidence. Some courts merely require
an intent to destroy evidence, 2 5 while others re-
quire a showing of bad faith.' 26 One lingering
question when using the inference is how much
weight to assign to it.127
For instance, then-Circuit Judge Breyer upheld
the district court's imposition of an adverse infer-
ence where a bankrupt company destroyed
records which may have traced its financial obliga-
122 Id. at 850.
123 Consider the following jury instruction:
If you find in this case the plaintiffs counsel and agents,
including (their expert witnesses) failed to fulfill this
duty [not to take actions that will cause the destruction
or loss of relevant evidence that will hinder the other
side from making its own examination and investigation
of all potentially relevant evidence], then you may take
this into account when considering the credibility of
(the expert witness) in his opinions and also you are per-
mitted to, if you feel justified in doing so, assume that
evidence made unavailable to the defendants by acts of
the plaintiff's counsel or agents, including (the expert
witness), would have been unfavorable to the plaintiffs
theory in the case.
FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12.05 (1997 supp.). See also
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d. 148, 154 (4th
Cir. 1995).
124 SeeW. Russell Welsh and Andrew C. Marquardt, Spoli-
ation of Evidence, 23 The Brief, Winter 1994, at 9. One of the
earliest cases to recognize such an inference was Armory v.
Delamirie, 93 Eng.Rep. 664 (&B. 1722). In Armoiy, the plain-
tiff sued the defendant jeweler after the plaintiff claimed the
jeweler stole his stone when appraising it. Finding for the
plaintiff, the judge ordered the jury to estimate damages us-
ing the value of the highest quality stones, not the supposed
value of the actual stone. Id. Compare Scout v. City of
Gordon, where the spoliation inference was not drawn where
plaintiff could not show any intentional destruction or fraud-
ulent misplacement of records by defendant. Scout based his
spoliation inference argument only on the mere unavailabil-
ity of hospital records. See 849 F. Supp. 687, 691 (D. Neb.
1994). That was not enough, and the Scout court used three
tests to determine whether a spoliation inference was war-
ranted: was the destruction of evidence "[1] intentional, [2]
fraudulent or [3] done with a desire to conceal and, thus,
frustrate the search for truth." See also Vick, 514 F.2d. 734,
737 (5th Cir. 1975) There, the trial court factored the lack of
bad faith in the destruction of the documents, as well as the
tions back to the plaintiff in Nationwide Check
Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc.128 Judge
Breyer ruled that the adverse inference was war-
ranted on two grounds: (1) the fact of destruction
itself satisfies the relevance of the documents ac-
cording to Fed.R.Evid. 401, and (2) a policy of
punishing those who destroy relevant evidence.
1 29
A trial court has wide discretion to impose sanc-
tions once relevancy is established.'
30
3. Suing in Tort to Remedy Destruction of Evidence
Nine states recognize that parties suffer a tor-
tious injury when a party destroys evidence.' 3 '
The tort allows a litigant to recover money dam-
ages against a party who spoliates evidence and
can be tried before a judge or jury along with the
underlying claim (personal injury, wrongful
death, etc.) which gave rise to the spoliation.'
32
This new tort, first recognized in Smith v. Superior
fact that destruction was performed well before interrogato-
ries were served.
125 See Solum & Marzen supra note 77, at 1088.
126 See id. at 1089, n.10. Professor Oesterle argues that
bad faith should not be a requirement for the inference be-
cause when the fact of destruction is made known to the
factfinder, that in itself helps the factfinder determine how
much weight to assign to the spoliator's other evidence. Oes-
terle, supra note 70, at 1235. There is also debate over how
the adversely affected party can rebut the inference. Courts
have accepted such arguments as: reliance on counsel; de-
struction was beyond the control of the spoliator (which itself
lacks intent); other evidence which disproves that the evi-
dence destroyed was what the court presumed it to be; or
that the document was irrelevant. See Solum and Marzen,
supra note 77, nn.12, 15, 17.
127 See Cedillo and Lopez, supra note 70, at 651. Courts
have split on whether to allow the inference to justify a ver-
dict against a spoliator. See Welsh and Marquardt, supra note
124, at 10 (contending that most courts do not hold that the
inference is sufficient to justify a verdict against the spolia-
tor).
128 See 692 F.2d. 214 (1st. Cir. 1982).
129 See id. at 218. But see Williams v. California, where
California Supreme Court refused to find the state liable for
evidence destruction. 664 P.2d. 137 (1983). A state highway
partrolman negligently inspected evidence relevant to a neg-
ligence action after a car accident, but he had assumed no
duty to do so. See id. at 142-43.
130 See id. at 219. See also Marrocco v. General Motors
Corp.,
131 The states that recognize the tort are Alaska, Califor-
nia Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, and Oklahoma. See Eric Marshall Wilson, Note,
The Alabama Supreme Court Sidesteps a Definitive Ruling in Chris-
tian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction Co. Should Alabama Adopt
the Independent Tort of Spoliation?, 47 ALA. L. REv. 971, 977-78
(Spring 1996).
132 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 8, § 4.1 at 140.
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Court,1 3 3 was closely analogized to the tort of in-
tentional interference with prospective business
advantage.' 
34
The Smith court spelled out five conditions nec-
essary to prove spoliation of evidence, based on
the test to prove intentional interference with
prospective business advantage: (1) economic re-
lationship between the moving party and some
third person containing the probability of some
future economic benefit to the moving party, (2)
knowledge by the nonmoving party of the exist-
ence of the relationship, (3) intentional acts on
the part of the nonmoving party designed to dis-
rupt the relationship, (4) disruption of the rela-
tionship, and (5) damages caused by disrup-
tion. ' :1
5
Smith stemmed from a personal injury suit in
which the defendant car dealership agreed to
maintain car parts for investigation.' 3" The deal-
ership then lost or transferred the parts, making it
impossible to inspect the parts for trial.' 37 On an
interlocutory appeal, the Smith court ruled that
"for every wrong there must be a remedy" and
thus, a party could be held liable for spoliating ev-
idence. 38 The court based its authority to create
the tort in the "probable expectancy" of the im-
pending suit and the harm the plaintiff suffered
as a result of the defendant's acts.139
A more controversial practice is to sue under
133 See Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d. 491
(Ca.l. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
134 See Welsh and Marquardt supra note 124, at 11.
Although the Smith court was the first to name the tort, its
origins go back over 100 years, to another California case, Fox
v. Hale & Norcross Silver Mining Co.. 41 P. 308 (1895). The
California Supreme Court there held that the destruction of
evidence was a "tortious act". Further, Pirocchi v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., was the first case to impose tort liability for
destruction of evidence. See 365 F.Supp. 277 (E.D.Pa. 1973).
The Pirocchi court held that one who assumes control of evi-
dence also assumes a duty to take reasonable care of that evi-
dence. See GORELICK ET AL. supra note 8, § 4.2 at 144-45.
'35 See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1984). See infra note 180 and accompany-
ing text for the test in its exact terms.
136 See id. at 494.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 496.
139 Id. at 502. Alaska established the tort in Hazen v.
Anchorage. See generally 718 P.2d. 456 (Alaska 1986).
141 Florida was the first to recognize the tort in Bondu v.
Gurvich, 473 So.2d. 1307 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984). According to
a recent law review note, only California, Florida, Idaho, Mis-
sissippi, and Oklahoma have recognized the tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence. See Wilson supra note 131, 978-79.
141 See 473 So. 2d. 1307 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984). California
established the tort in Velasco v. Commercial Building Mainte-
the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. 14
Created in 1984 by a Florida appellate court in
Bondu v. Gurvich,14 1 the court held that a duty ex-
isted for a hospital to retain records concerning
the victim of an operating room death. The hos-
pital breached that duty when it failed to maintain
medical records and treatment notes. 142 Relying
on Professor Prosser's words that "new and name-
less torts are being recognized constantly" and
finding that the hospital owed the plaintiff a duty
to preserve the records, the Bondu court re-
manded the case to litigate this new claim.' 43 So-
lum and Marzen reasoned that this negligence
tort is sound because it serves the goals of fairness
and deterrence. 1
44
C. Document Retention Policies: Eliminating
Smoking Guns and Nuclear Warheads
45
The reasons for implementing a document de-
struction policy are plain.146 Cost is a significant
factor. With paper piling up in warehouses and
file cabinets, a systematic purge of files helps keep
storage more manageable and cheaper.1 47 After
years of operation, storage costs are staggering for
a company such as IBM.'
4
Perhaps the most important reason is that a
properly managed records retention policy
reduces legal exposure. 4 9 A document manage-
nance Co., by borrowing from the tort of negligent interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage. See generally 169
Cal. App. 3d. 874 (1985). The court applied a six-part test:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, (2) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3)
degree of certainty of the plaintiff's separate inquiry, (4) the
closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and (6) policy of preventing future
harm. See id. at 877-79 (1985). Because the claim in Velasco
failed the second prong, the case was dismissed. See id.
142 See id. at 1312.
14" Id. at 1312-13, citing W. PROSSER, TORTS § 1 pp. 3-4
(4th ed. 1971). The dissent argued that under the majority's
reasoning, "every case would be subject to constant retrials in
the guise of independent actions." Bondu, 473 So.2d. at
1314.
144 See Solum and Marzen, supra note 77, at 1105-06.
145 See Allen, supra note 10.
146 See Betty Ann Olmstead, Electronic Media: Management
Litigation Issue When "Delete" Doesn't Mean Delete, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 532 (1996).
147 See Fedders and Guttenplan supra note 76, at 11.
148 In one long standing antitrust suit, IBM spent $2 mil-
lion in document storage costs alone in an eight-month pe-
riod. See In re International Business Machines Corp., 687
F.2d. 591, 603 (2d. Cir. 1984).
149 Fedders and Guttenplan outlined the advantages and
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ment program performed routinely is much less
likely to raise eyebrows than one done informally
or on an as-needed basis. 1511 A retention program
must make sure that (1) companies preserve doc-
uments to comply with laws and regulations for as
long as necessary, (2) companies file documents
necessary for the conduct of business in a system-
atic way to ease access, (3) they keep documents
that the they know will be relevant in a judicial,
investigative or congressional investigation, (4)
that permanent documents are stored on micro-
film to aid storage and retrieval, and (5) every-
thing else is destroyed.
1 51
For example, in Lezwy v. Remington Arms Co.,
1 5 2
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals created a test
for the reasonableness of such a records retention
policy. The plaintiff brought a products liability
action when she was injured accidentally by her
son's gun.1 53 After an adverse jury verdict, Rem-
ington argued that the inference imposed by the
trial court was unwarranted because the docu-
ments were destroyed pursuant to its routine doc-
ument destruction procedures.
1 54
The appellate court remanded the case to the
trial level to determine (1) if Remington's record
retention policy was reasonable considering the
disadvantages of a document retention plan.
Advantages [include]: (1) elimination of storage of un-
necessary documents, (2) reduction in the retrieval cost
of documents when requested in a lawsuit, investigation
or business relation, (3) reduction in the legal risks from
documents, especially ones which were "hastily drafted,
erroneous or misleading," and (4) the avoidance of an
adverse inference from the non-production of those
documents.
Fedders and Guttenplan supra note 76, at 13.
Disadvantages [include]: (1) the expense of establishing
the program, both in time and money, (2) inability to
prove a fact conclusively later on, (3) less flexibility to
respond to requests for documents, (4) adverse infer-
ences stemming from incomplete compliance with the
program, (5) adverse inferences from the "selective de-
struction" of documents not subject to the program, and
(6) other adverse effects, including discovery of how the
program works.
Id.
150 Welsh and Marquardt, supra note 124, at 36, contend-
ing that any ad hoc document destruction done without a
record management plan will be "viewed
with .... suspicion." Gorelick et al. wrote that "cavalier"
document destruction invites "grave risks." Supra note 8, §
8.1 at 276. See generally GNC, 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal.
1984) at 1446-50; King v. National Security Fire and Casualty
Co., 656 So.2d. 1335, 1336-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Wil-
lard v. Caterpillar Inc., 40 Cal.App.4th 892, 905-06 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
151 See Fedders and Guttenplan, supra note 76, at 12.
circumstances surrounding the relevant docu-
ments; 55 (2) whether lawsuits concerning the
complaint or related complaints were filed, how
many were filed, and the magnitude of each com-
plaint; 56 and (3) whether the retention policy
was begun in good faith. 157 Even if the policy was
instituted in good faith, the circumstances sur-
rounding the document destruction in a particu-
lar case may suffice for an adverse inference. 15
In early 1997, Prudential Insurance Company
("Prudential") came under fire for its document
retention policy and recurring destruction of doc-
uments by its employees. 159 After a class action
suit was filed by policyholders in 1995, the district
court ordered Prudential to preserve all relevant
documents. 160 Prudential sent orders to its em-
ployees to preserve documents in accordance with
the court's order, but destruction of relevant doc-
uments continued.. 6' In response, the court lev-
ied a $1 million fine, directed a mailing to all em-
ployees describing the litigation, and ordered the
company to promulgate a document retention
policy. 162 Significantly, the court found, however,
that there was no willful misconduct on Pruden-
tial's part.'
63
In Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,
164
152 See generally 836 F.2d. 1104 (1988).
153 See id. at 1105.
154 See id. at 1111. The documents in this case were
records of complaints and gun examination reports. See id. If
no action was taken concerning these documents, Reming-
ton destroyed them after three years. See id. See also Carlucci
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D.Fla. 1984) (where
court entered default judgment against Piper because it
failed to show it complied with its own document retention
policy).
155 See Lewy, 836 F.2d. at 1112. The court asked, "For
example, the court should determine whether a three year
retention policy is reasonable given the particular docu-
ment." Id. The remanded case was not reported nor avail-




159 See 169 F.R.D. 598 (D. N.J. 1997).
160 See id. at 612.
161 See id. at 607-10, 611-12.
162 See id. at 616-17.
163 See id. at 616. In October 1997, The Wall StreetJour-
nal reported that the plaintiffs' attorneys discovered that
1,200 documents, including some key documents in the liti-
gation, were thrown into a trash bin at Prudential's offices.
See Leslie Scism, Prudential Tried to Destroy Papers, Lawyer Al-
leges, WALL ST.J. Oct. 7, 1997 at B10.
164 See generally 1 F.3d. 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 90 F.3d. 553 (1996).
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archivists and federal officials litigated a point
crucial to this Comment. On the last day of Presi-
dent Reagan's second term, journalists filed suit
against the Executive Office of the President to
prevent destruction of electronic records con-
tained in White House computers. 65 At issue, in-
ter alia,16 6 were the duties of federal agencies to
preserve electronic documents - e-mail
messages. 67 The district court found that agen-
cies' practice of printing out e-mails which em-
ployees thought fell under the Federal Records
Act 6" was insufficient because the information
on-screen contained data which the printed copy
did not.I16 ' The court ordered the agencies to re-
tain the electronic copies under the Federal
Records Act, and also held that agencies must pe-
riodically review their electronic record keeping
policies. 7 1 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ul-
timately reversed itself on other grounds. 7
1
These cases illustrate that organizations' docu-
ment retention policies may become a part of the
lawsuit in which they are involved. In fact, one
writer predicted that courts may be less willing to
excuse the lack of relevant documents due to a
records retention policy. 172 If this trend contin-
ues, organizations will need to reevaluate their
policies to ensure that they not only follow them,
but that the policies themselves pass judicial scru-
tiny.
TV. SYNTHESIS: COMPANIES MUST
RETHINK DOCUMENT RETENTION
POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE
PREVALENCE OF E-MAIL
A. Destruction of Electronic Mail Evidence
As stated, simply hitting delete most likely will
not rid the computer of the e-mail.1 73 Yet many
computer users mistakenly believe when the
message leaves their "inbox" it is gone forever.)
74
Courts have little trouble overruling employees'
privacy claims when superiors monitor their trans-
missions.1 75 Employers have a well-defined inter-
est in making sure employees are performing to-
wards company goals; as the case law indicates,
employers need to monitor their employees' elec-
tronic messages.
176
Courts should not hesitate to impose Rule 37
default sanctions for destruction of e-mail evi-
dence. It is clear from the rule's language that
courts need not exclude certain types of evidence
from their purview. 177 The Rules of Civil Proce-
dure empower courts to administer discovery in
the most efficient way possible. Thus, other popu-
lar sanctions for evidence destruction should be
applied to e-mail. Judges should instruct juries to
find a fact as true if they determine that a party
destroyed evidence. In the alternative, the judges
165 At the same time, plaintiffs filed Freedom of Informa-
tion Act requests for material stored electronically on systems
in the Executive Office of the President and the National Se-
curity Council. See id. at 1280.
166 See 44 U.S.C. § 3105; see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924
F.2d. 282, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1991). A long procedural history
preceded this opinion, and defendants initially agreed to
preserve the computer tapes, but also filed a motion for dis-
missal, or alternatively, for summary judgment. See Arm-
strong, I F.3d. at 1280. That motion was denied in Armstrong
v. Bush, 721 F.Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1989). Next, the D.C. Cir-
cuit court held on an interlocutory appeal, first, that the
plaintiffs had standing, and that only the agencies' destruc-
tion programs could be reviewed. See Armstrong, 1 F.3d. at
1280, citing Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d. 282, 287-288. Then,
the case was remanded to determine what instructions the
agencies gave their employees, and on remand, the district
court determined electronic communications were included
within the meaning of the FRA, and determined that the
agencies' methods for preserving the communications was in-
sufficient under the FRA. See Armstrong, 1 F.3d. at 1281, cit-
ing 924 F.2d. at 340-341.
167 See Armstrong, I F.3d. at 1274.
168 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101 etseq., 2901 et seq., 3101 et seq.
169 The district court also found that the record keeping
method was "arbitrary and capricious" because individual
employees, instead of designated records managers, made
decisions to dispose of records. Armstrong, I F.3d at 1281,
citing 924 F.2d. at 347.
170 See id. at 1287-88.
171 See generally 90 F.3d. 553 (1996).
172 See John Montafia, Record Retention Schedules in Court:
The Pitfalls 10/96 REC. MGMT. Q. 32.
17- See Betty Ann Olmstead, Electronic Media: Management
and Litigation Issues When "Delete" Doesn't Mean Delete, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 523 (1996).
174 Id. at 523; see also Kim S. Nash, Computer Detectives Un-
cover Smoking Guns: Cybersleuths Glean Evidence From Backup
Tapes, COMPUTER WORLD, June 9, 1997 at 1.
175 SeeJonathan Rosenoer, CYBERLAW 168 (1997).
176 See Strauss, 814 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Markels, supra note 5.
177 See FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2).
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should tell juries that the fact should be accepted
as established without giving them any discretion
to find otherwise.
But courts should not leap to conclusions based
on traditional document destruction. When de-
leting e-mail, intent is more difficult to measure
for two reasons: (1) acts on a computer can be
quick and permanent and (2) such wide levels of
computer proficiency exist.178 Intent is more dif-
ficult to measure when a user hits the enter but-
ton by mistake and destroys the last copy of an e-
mail message. For instance, nearly every com-
puter user has inadvertently hit the wrong key and
supplied the computer with an unintended com-
mand. These mistakes often can be corrected,
but sometimes a message cannot be restored.
Obstruction of justice statutes' application to
destruction of e-mail evidence is unclear.1 79 Er-
rant keystrokes may delete an e-mail, and under
the Neiswender approach it appears that courts
may impute intent.180 If carried to its conclusion,
one who deletes an e-mail by mistake may subject
himself to criminal liability. In addition, there ap-
pears to be much room for debate on what level
of intent would be necessary to find a destroyer of
e-mail liable under intentional spoliation of evi-
dence. As the reader will recall, there are six
prongs necessary to prove the tort: (1) pending or
probable civil litigation, (2) defendant's knowl-
edge that litigation is pending, (3) willful destruc-
tion of evidence, (4) intent to interfere with plain-
tiff's prospective civil suit, (5) a causal
relationship between the evidence destroyed and
the inability to prove the allegations in the lawsuit
178 See Clarke, supra note 58, at 223 (arguing that prov-
ing mens rea for computer-related crimes is the most difficult
aspect of the prosecution).
179 See GORELICK, ET AL., supra note 8, § 2.22H at 61
(Supp. 1997)
180 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
181 See Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 4th 892,
910-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
182 See Welsh and Marquardt, supra note 124.
183 See John Montafia, Legal Issues in EDI (Electronic Data
Interchange), 7/96 REc. MGMT. Q. 39 (arguing that record re-
tention policies are more complicated because electronic
data systems are programmed to automatically backup infor-
mation, rather than discard it, making it more difficult to
know whether all copies of a document have been de-
stroyed). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (mandating preservation
of all communications which fall within § 240.17a3(4),(6-
10)).
184 In response, The New York Times has installed a pro-
gram which automatically deletes e-mail after 30 days, and
Amgen, Applied Materials Corporation, and 76 Products
and (6) damages caused by destruction. 81 It is
the third and fourth prongs which in the context
of e-mail destruction may cause judges to pause
and think.
Because of the greater physical contact with the
piece of paper to be shredded, it is harder to ar-
gue that one accidentally shredded a document.
It is not disputed that accidental shredding of pa-
per occurs regularly, but the overwhelmingly
widespread use of computers and varying levels of
understanding of that technology appear to make
mistakes like these much more common than
with paper shredding.
The intent question becomes even more diffi-
cult when suing under negligent spoliation of evi-
dence tort because, as in all negligence actions,
courts impute a duty to defendants. The duty re-
volves around a standard of care which is espe-
cially hard to define in this scenario because of
varying levels of computer competence. Courts
must decide how does a "reasonable person" op-
erate her e-mail program? Estimation of dam-
ages, in addition, presents a problem in either the
intentional or negligent tort.8 2 The same is true
for destruction of e-mail evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The computer revolution has changed how
companies store documents.! 8 Corporate
America, however, has been slow to react.'
8 4
Many companies have records managers and sys-
tems to preserve company records, but few have
electronic records managers. i s 5 It is obvious that
Company created document retention policies to deal with e-
mail. See Alex Markels, Workplace: The Messy Business of Culling
Computer Files, WALL ST.J., May 22, 1997 at BI. In addition,
software is being developed that looks for "hotwords" in an e-
mail that might trigger a lawsuit. See id.
185 See Richard J. Cox, Re-Defining Electronic Records Man-
agement, 10/96 REc. MGMT. Q. 12.
"Archivists and records managers need to develop a co-
herent approach to electronic records management be-
cause we need to assume that the majority of record
keeping systems will be electronic and because institu-
tional managers and technical professionals are begin-
ning to understand better the challenges of managing
information in electronic form. The declining costs, the
greater array of software, the increasingly hospitable
legal environment, and other such factors are providing
means by which record keeping systems will be trans-
ferred to electronic systems and used in electronic
means.
Id. The author of a recent piece on e-mail destruction and
lawsuits wrote that many companies want to delete perma-
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companies need such managers when they store
thousands of e-mails going back three years or
more. 186 With improved technology, electronic
storage adds another layer of complexity to com-
panies' storage needs. 1 7  The three criteria
spelled out in Remington, along with the analysis
provided by Armstrong, should give companies a
clearer understanding of courts' concerns when
electronic messages are destroyed.
nently e-mail as quickly as 90 days or as late as one year to
avoid liability. See Barb Cole-Gomolski, Lethal Sting of Forgot-
ten Mail: IS Examines Policy as Costly Suits Pile Up, COMPIJUER
WORLD, Sept. 8, 1997 at 117.
186 See Markels, supra note 184.
For many reasons, the legal consequences of e-
mail transmission will continue to confront
courts. As e-mail technology becomes more and
more global, standardized solutions will ease
courts' burdens in confronting cutting edge legal
issues. We are only at the beginning.
187 See Cox, supra note 185. A few of the benefits of
records storage in the electronic age are (1) reduced costs,
(2) faster more complete data interchange, and (3) quicker
access to information. Montafia, supra note 183. See also
Lovell and Holmes, supra note 19.
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